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Local Government Law
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
In a year dusted by destiny, local government law seized undisputed
leadership in a new legal world order. Deploying dazzling analytical force
in a gulf of litigational dissipation, and deftly defusing primitive land
mines of mediocrity, the subject drew a line of liberating enlightenment
in the sands of juristic history. With illustrative cases positioned as defensive missiles, and selected statutes marshalled with bomb sight precision, this survey advances to quench the flaming wells of desperation
torched by other disciplines. It is the mother of all surveys.
I.

MuN~cipArrms

A. Powers
As the fuel of choice for the governmental engine, municipal power is
the-recipient of respectful legal attention. When challenges choke engine
ignition, the municipal source of energy supply must conform to the law's
specifications. Typically, the municipality derives that source from statutory deposits unearthed to justify both spark and acceleration.1
On two occasions during the survey period, those deposits lay in the
Georgia Territorial Electric Service Act.2 In both instances, the munici* Talmadge Professor of Law, University of Georgia (A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard
University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
Deep appreciation is expressed to the Carl Vinson Institute of Government of the University of Georgia for summer research support that contributed most significantly to the preparation of this survey.
1. For treatment of local government power, see generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Discretion in Georgia Local Government Law, 8 GA. L. REv. 614 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Reasoning by Riddle: The Power to Prohibit in Georgia Local Government Law, 9 GA. L.
REV. 115 (1974), reprinted in P. SENTELL, STUDIES INGEORGIA LocAL GOVERNMENT LAw 651,
693 (3d ed. 1977) (hereinafter P. SENTELL, STUDIES]; see also the discussion in R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., The United States Supreme Court as Home Rule Wrecker, 34 MERCER L. REv.
363 (1982), reprinted in P. SErzELL, ADDITIONAL STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW 107 (1983) [hereinafter P. SENTELL, ADDITIONAL STUDIES].
2. O.C.G.A. § 46-3-1 to -15 (1982 & Supp. 1991).
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pality extracted them to the court of appeals satisfaction. North Georgia
Electric Membership Corp. v. City of Calhouns featured a challenge to
the municipality's supply of electricity beyond its assigned service area
but to its own water facility.4 Affirming the Public Service Commission's
denial of the challenge,' the court relied first upon the statutory exception for a supplier's "service to any of its own premises devoted to public
service."" Second, the court characterized the service as other than the
"retail service" covered by the municipality's agreement with the challenger (a competing supplier).7
Colquitt Electric Membership Corp. v. City of Moultrie$ challenged
municipal electricity to the new county jail. That jail, plaintiff argued,
was but a part of the previously existing correctional institute already
serviced by plaintiff.' Again affirming (and deferring to) the Public Service Commission, the court rejected the challenge. 10 Evidence justified the
Commission's conclusion that, although physically connected, the two facilities fulfilled different purposes1 1 and were operated by different legal
entities." Accordingly, the institute and the new jail "are two electric
1 8 and the county was free to elect municipremises, separately metered,"
1'
pal service for the jail.
3. 195 Ga. App. 382, 393 S.E.2d 510 (1990).
4. The municipality owned and operated the facility, a raw water intake facility to
which the challenger had previously supplied electricity. Id. at 382, "393 S.E.2d at 511.
5. The court reasoned that the PSC,the agency charged with enforcement and.administration of the statute, "is entitled to great deference in its interpretation of the Act." Id. at
384, 393 S.E.2d at 513.
6. O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8(e)(5) (1982). The court viewed the exception as giving the municipality "the clear and unambiguous right to serve its own facility, provided the premises at
issue are 'devoted to public service' whether or not the premises are located in an area
otherwise 'assigned' to another electric supplier." 195 Ga. App. at 383, 393 S.E.2d at 512.
7. That agreement provided that the municipality should not extend its lines east of I75 (where the facility was located), but it related only to "retail service," which the court
construed to mean sales directly to the ultimate consumer. That agreement did not give the
challenger "the exclusive right to provide electric service to the premises at issue here." 195
Ga. App. at 384, 393 S.E.2d at 513.
8. 197 Ga. App. 794, 399 S.E.2d 497 (1990).
9. Id. at 794, 399 S.E.2d at 498. A covered walkway connected the jail and the institute,
and the challenger would without question continue supplying electricity to the institute.
Otherwise, the jail was located in an "unassigned area" which either the municipality or
plaintiff could service. Id. at 795, 399 S.E.2d at 498.
10. Id. at 797, 399 S.E.2d at 499.
11. The institute would house convicted prisoners; the jail would primarily house pretrial detainees. Id.at 795, 399 S.E.2d at 498-99.
12. The State Department of Corrections supervised and managed the institute; the
county sheriff supervised and managed the jail. Id.
13. Id. at 797, 399 S.E.2d at 499.
14. Id.
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The remaining power controversy, Freeman v. City of Atlanta,", involved municipal confiscation of plaintiff's money as drug transaction
proceeds.16 Although the condemnation proceedings were not commenced
within thirty days as required by state statute, 17 the court noted municipal transfer of the funds to the federal drug enforcement agency. 1' That
agency operated under federal statute," the court held, and its forfeiture
proceeding pre-empted state statutory requirements.2
B. Officers and Employees
Once launched, the governmental capsule's entry into an orbit of effective and efficient administration requires a sophisticated guidance system
under the control of skilled technicians. Those technicians-the government's officers and employees-were-the subjects of considerable litigation this year. The officer's first accomplishment consists of attaining office: the focus of Johnson v. Collins.3 In response to a complaint of
misconduct in the municipal election, the supreme court referred an unsuccessful council candidate to the statute authorizing the contest." Even
assuming the allegations were correct, plaintiff failed to show that the
misconduct "was sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the
'3
election. 1
Emphasizing a preliminary employment concern, statutory law mandates a peace officer's completion of a basic training course.", City of
Pembroke v. Hagin25 involved one municipality's method of providing
that training. Specifically, the municipality required a contract that the
police officer would pay a part of his training cost if he then vacated the
15. 195 Ga. App. 641, 394 S.E.2d 784 (1990).
16. Municipal police officers arrested plaintiff for failure to prove automobile insurance
and then discovered the money, which the police drug dog identified as drug money. Id. at
641, 394 S.E.2d at 784.
17. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(e) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
18. The court held that both the state and federal governments possessed condemnation
authority. 195 Ga. App. at 641, 394 S.E.2d at 785.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
20. 195 Ga. App. at 642, 394 S.E.2d at 785. "However, since the federal government
brought the forfeiture proceeding, and not the State, OCGA sec. 16-13.49(e) has no application in this case." Id. The court affirmed summary judgment for the municipality. 195 Ga.
App. at 642, 394 S.E.2d at 785.
21. 260 Ga. 152, 391 S.E.2d 113 (1990).
22. Id. at 153, 391 S.E.2d at 114 (citing O.C.G.A. § 21-3-422(1) (1987)).
23. Id.
24. O.C.G.A. § 35-8-9(a) (1987). The statute mandates the training course within twelve
months of appointment and conditions the officer's arrest power upon completion. Id. § 358-9(a), (c).
25. 194 Ga. App. 642, 391 S.E.2d 465 (1990).
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position within twelve months." Reviewing a trial judge's condemnation
of the agreement on the basis of "public policy,"1'7 the court of appeals
expressed reluctance to interfere with freedom of contract. Rather, the
court assessed the challenged agreement as "reasonably related to the
City's interest in protecting its investment in training a new officer." 8
Clearing the hurdle of public policy," the court was direct in its advice to
the complainant: simply stay on the job for twelve months.' 0
Regretfully, municipal employment entails the risk of injury and the
accompanying issue of disability benefits. In City of Adel v.jWise," an
injured fire department employee refused to accept alternative work as a
police radio dispatcher. On the issue of justification,"3 the supreme court
reversed both the State Board of Workers' Compensation and the court
of appeals." Under the applicable statute,"4 the court reasoned, the
Board must apply a two-pronged test: the employee's physical capacity
for the proffered employment, and justification for the refusal. The justification must relate to physical capacity," the court held, and "it was

26. Id. at 643, 391 S.E.2d at 466. The case presented a municipal effort to recover from
an officer who voluntarily terminated his employment prior to the expiration of twelve
months.
2R. The trial court held the contract to contravene public policy by shifting municipal
cost onto the individual officer. Id.
28. Id. at 644, 391 S.E.2d at 467.
29. "We find no intent by the legislature in the applicable code sections to impose the
financial burden of training a peace officer solely upon the law enforcement unit employing
him." Id.
30. "In order to avoid the requirement of paying the amount specified in the agreement,
the officer could simply have remained in his employment for twelve months." Id. The court
awarded judgment to the municipality. Id.
31. 261 Ga. 53, 401 S.E.2d 522 (1991).
32. Statutes authorize termination of benefits upon the employee's refusal of suitable
employment, unless "in the opinion of the board such refusal was justified." O.C.G.A. § 349-240 (1988).
33. 261 Ga. at 56, 401 S.E.2d, at 525. The court of appeals observed that the transfer
would reduce the employee's income by $163 per week, because he would have been required to give up a part-time job at a bank that he could otherwise have held. Wise v. City
of Adel, 195 Ga. App. 559, 559, 394 S.E.2d 540, 541 (1990).
34. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-240 (1988).
35. 261 Ga. at 54-55, 401 S.E.2d at 524.
We hold that the discretion afforded the board ... to determine that an employee's refusal of proffered work is justified must relate to the physical capacity
of the employee to perform the job; the employee's ability or skill to perform the
job; or factors such as geographic relocation or travel conditions which would disrupt the employee's life.
Id. at 56, 401 S.E.2d at 525.
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error for the board to consider the potential loss of a part-time job in
determining whether the employment was suitable."'
Compensation benefits also dominated Adams v. Collins,' an action
against a municipality for the wrongful death of its police officer.' s Because the death occurred during the officer's temporary assignment to another municipality,s" the court of appeals plumbed provisions of the assignment contract. Finding the defendant municipality's agreement
explicitly to provide workers' compensation coverage,'0 the court held the
officer's actual employment status immaterial.41 The agreement itself was
sufficient to trigger the "exclusive remedy" provision of the workers' compensation statute" and to shield the municipality from wrongful death
responsibility.'8
C. Regulation
Municipal regulation of activity claims linchpin significance in the
governmenal power quagmire." However, unauthorized efforts in the
name of regulation can be fatal. This point found illustration in City of
College Park v. Atlantic Southeastern Airlines, Inc." Involving an airline's claim for refunds, the case turned upon whether the municipal exaction constituted a tax (refundable within three years) or a regulatory
fee (refundable within one year)." The court of appeals rejected the mu36. Id. Justice Hunt concurred only in the judgment. Justice Benham, joined by Presiding Justice Smith, dissented on grounds that the court was inappropriately restricting the
discretion which the administrative board was authorized and directed to employ. Id. at 58,
401 S.E.2d at 526 (Smith & Benham, JJ., dissenting).
37. 195 Ga. App. 36, 392 S.E.2d 549 (1990).
38. Id. at 36, 392 S.E.2d at 549. For treatment of workers' compensation issues, see generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Workers' Compensation in Georgia Municipal Law, 15 GA. L.
Rzv. 57 (1980), reprinted iri P. Sm'mL, ADDmoNAL STmtzs, supra note 1, at 487.
39. The officer was killed in a narcotics undercover operation. 195 Ga. App. at 36, 392
S.E.2d at 550.
40. Id. Defendant municipality contracted to continue to pay the officer and provide his
benefits while he was on loan. Defendant also reserved the right to recall the officer at any
time. Id.
41. Id. at 36-37, 392 S.E.2d at 550. It was also immaterial, the court reasoned, that the
employee's activities at the time of his death may have benefitted only the municipality to
which he was on loan. Id.
42. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (1988 & Supp. 1991). Workers' compensation was "the exclusive
remedy for appellant in this situation regardless of whether the City was [the officer's] 'employer' at the time of his death." 195 Ga. App. at 37, 392 S.E.2d at 550.
43. The court affirmed the trial judge's summary judgment for the municipality. Id.
44. See generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Discretion in Georgia Local Government Law, 8
GA. L. Rav. 614 (1974), reprinted in P. SzNrmL, STuDms, supra note 1, at 651.
45. 194 Ga. App. 637, 391 S.E.2d 460 (1990).
46. Id. at 638, 391 S.E.2d at 461 (citing O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380 (1982)).
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nicipality's "regulation" defense and termed the charge "a tax, variable in
amount, based upon the volume of business revenues or number of employees, whichever is greater."" Because federal law condemned gross receipts assessments on airlines,"' the court held'the
municipality subject to
s
a refund claim within three years of payment."
Regulatory power does not insure successful enforcement. In Upton v.
City of Atlanta,"0 for example, there was no problem with a municipal
ordinance requiring towing services to accept insured "checks."" The issue went to enforcement of the ordinance against a towing service that
refused to accept a draft drawn on a credit agency. The supreme court
responded with two statutory definitions: first, a "check" is a draft drawn
on a "bank";5 ' second, a "bank" does not include a "credit union." 8 Accordingly, the draft in issue did not constitute a check, and defendant's
refusal did not contravene the ordinance."
Valid regulation also requires deference to constitutional freedoms: specifically, the freedom of expression. This freedom undergirded the challenge in Hirsh v. City of Atlanta" to regulation of antiabortion demonstrations on municipal streets."s Declaring protestors' blockades a "public
nuisance,""7 the municipality obtained an injunction creating "free zones"
within fifty feet of an abortion facility" and restricting each zone to
twenty demonstrators." Additionally, the injunction established five-foot
47. Id. The court observed that the municipal code expressly imposed a "flat fee" license
fee as a precondition to do business and subsequently levied the challenged exaction in
addition to the license fee. Id. at 639, 391 S.E.2d at 462.
48. 49 U.S.C.A. App. § 1513 (West Supp. 1991).
49. 194 Ga. App. at 639, 391 S.E.2d at 462. The court rejected a municipal attack on
plaintiff's claim notice for not stating the grounds for the refund. Said the court: "There is
no requirement that the 'summary of grounds' must be the exact grounds upon which refund is ultimately authorized; such a requirement would require the taxpayer to become a
seer." Id.
50. 260 Ga. 250, 392 S.E.2d 244 (1990).
51. Id. at 251, 392 S.E.2d at 245. The supreme court sustained the validity of the ordinance in Porter v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 526, 384 S.E.2d 631 (1989).
52. 260 Ga. at 251, 392 S.E.2d at 245 (citing O.C.G.A. § 11-3-104(2)(b) (1982)).
53. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 7-1-4(7) (1989 & Supp. 1991)).
54. Id. The court unanimously reversed defendant's conviction. Id.
55. 261 Ga. 22, 401 S.E.2d 530 (1991).
56. Id. at 25, 401 S.E.2d at 533. These occurred in the summer of 1988, primarily during
the National Democratic Convention. Id. at 23, 401 S.E.2d at 531.
57. Id. The court affirmed existence of municipal charter power to define a nuisance and
provide for abatement. Id. at 28, 401 S.E.2d at 535.
58. I.e., within fifty feet of the facility's property line. Id. at 26, 401 S.E.2d at 534.
59. Id., 401 S.E.2d at 533. The court agreed that this restricted the protestors' prior
behavior, but judged it to leave "ample alternative channels of communication" open. Id.
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"bubble zones"" within which protestors could not (without consent) approach other individuals. s Upon challenge, a majority of the supreme
court pronounced the injunction a "content-neutral" regulation" aimed
at dangers possessed of "significant governmental interests."' s The court,
reviewing evidence indicating a threat to municipal order, deemed the injunction's restrictions reasonable as to time, place, and manner." The
court perceived those restrictions as necessary, therefore, "to preserve the
continued exercise of liberty, including [the demonstrators'] rights of free
speech and assembly." 5
The survey period's remaining regulatory contests arose from license
controversies unfolding in the context of mandamus actions." In Sego v.
City of Peachtree City,67 a closely divided court upheld municipal denial
of an 'alcoholic beverage license."s Operating on the "clearly erroneous"
standard of review, the court was unwilling to reverse the trial judge's
approach to the material municipal ordinance."s That approach derived
"ascertainable standards" from the entire ordinance rather than a single
section, yielding the conclusion that the applicant had failed to estab60. Id., 401 S.E.2d at 534. These zones were limited to areas within fifty feet of the
facility's property line and fifty feet of a parking lot used by the facility's staff and patients.
Id.
61. Id. This, the court said, prevented facility patients, physicians, and staff from being
"swarmed" by the demonstrators. Id.
62. Id. at 25, 401 S.E.2d at 533. The court determined that a "content-neutral" regulation "applies irrespective of the subject matter to be communicated and does not single out
a particular content of speech for better or worse treatment." Id.
63. Id. The court acknowledged "significant governmental interest" as controlling traffic
on streets and sidewalks, dispersement of law enforcement personnel city-wide, orderly operation of pretrial detention facility, and operation of lawful businesses. Id.
64. Id. at 28, 401 S.E.2d at 535.
65. Id. The court thus sustained the validity of the ordinance. In a dissenting opinion
joined by Presiding Justice Smith, Justice Fletcher deemed the injunction overbroad. Id. at
29, 401 S.E.2d at 535 (Smith & Fletcher, JJ., dissenting).
66. See generally P. SrerML, MSCASTING MmAMus tN GEORGA LocAL GOVERNMzNT
LAw (1989).
67. 260 Ga. 388, 392 S.E.2d 877 (1990).
68. Id. at 389, 392 S.E.2d at 878. For treatment of the subject generally, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law and Liquor Licensing: A Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L.
REv. 1039 (1981), reprinted in P. SNTEILL, ADTONAL STuDms, supra note 1, at 283.
69. 260 Ga. at 389, 392 S.E.2d at 878.
70. "The trial court looked to the ordinance as a whole to find the ascertainable standards and looking to the ordinance as a whole decided that there was no clear legal right to
the license and denied the writ of mandamus." Id. The municipal council was apparently
concerned over the applicant's having received two DUI's within a period of four years. For
treatment of the subject generally, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., "Ascertainable Standards"versus "Unbridled Discretion in Local Government Regulation," GA. CoUNTY Gov. Dec. 1989,
19; 1 GMA Info. Series 1 (Jan. 1990).
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lish a "clear legal right" to the license.' 1
In contrast, a unanimous court reversed the trial judge in Inner Visions, Ltd. v. City of Smyrna,'7 thereby disapproving municipal denial of
a license for sale of nonalcoholic drinks and live entertainment. Emphasizing that applicant's property was zoned for general commercial purposes, the court could not abide the municipal objection of noncompliance with the building code. 7 ' Applicant was entitled to consideration
under the then-existing zoning ordinance, the court asserted, and "[ilf the
condition of the building did not comply with the city's building code,
[applicant] would have been entitled to the issuance of a license contingent upon compliance." ' "
D. Contracts
No municipality is an island; both existence and viability require services and goods obtained from others. The agreements for effectuating
these requirements are the subjects of considerable litigation.
Initially, the municipality must possess authority to enter into the
agreement. In Cole v. City of Atlanta, 5 professional golfers charged
breach of an oral contract procuring their services on municipal golf
courses." In response, the court of appeals adumbrated a contracting
party's "duty" to determine a municipality's compliance "with the laws
limiting and prescribing its powers.' 7 Accordingly, the court reasoned,
plaintiffs must "clearly show that the contract was authorized."'78 Plain-

71. 260 Ga. at 389, 392 S.E.2d at 878. In a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Bell and
Hunt, Justice Weltner maintained that only one standard for the issuance of licenses appeared in the ordinance, that the applicant had met that standard, and that equal protection afforded applicant a right of mandamus. Id. at 390, 392 S.E.2d at 878-79 (Weltner, Bell
& Hunt, JJ., dissenting).
72. 260 Ga. 902, 400 S.E.2d 915 (1991).
73. Id. at 902-03, 400 S.E.2d at 916. This was the municipality's expressed reason for
rejecting the application.
74. Id. at 903, 400 S.E.2d at 916.
75. 195 Ga. App. 67, 392 S.E.2d 283 (1990).
76. Plaintiffs alleged a contract to provide services on the municipal golf courses until
their retirement age and charged municipal breach in leasing those courses to another corporation. Id.
77. Id. at 68, 392 S.E.2d at 284.
78. Id.
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tiffs having failed to meet that obligation 7 9 it was clear "that the alleged
contract, even if proven, would be unauthorized."' 0
A second consideration is whether the municipality's contracting capacity comes into play. Illustratively, Precise v. City of Rossvilles' featured
the claim of a police officer alleging municipal breach of an employment
contract."2 Denominating hiring and firing of police officers as a "governmental function," the court of appeals held the suit "barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity."" Forcefully reversing, the supreme court
denied that governmental immunity had ever served as a defense to municipal contract liability." The supreme court asserted "that municipal
immunity is not a valid defense to an action for breach of contract. Anything to the contrary is specifically overruled." '
On occasion, the parties may, in the terms of the agreement itself, provide an alternative to litigation. In City of College Park v. Batson-Cook
Co., 6 the parties instanced that practice in a guaranteed maximum cost
contract for constructing a municipal convention center.8 7 The contract
contained a clause requiring arbitration of all claims and disputes between contractor and municipality. When disagreement subsequently
arose over the contractor's claim for excess costs,8 ' however, the parties
79. Id. "The record in the instant case does not reveal any evidence, other than bare
statements of opinion by city officials, that the contract alleged was authorized pursuant to
acts of the City." Id. The court held that the unauthorized nature of the contract "also
forecloses appellants from asserting estoppel against the City." Id. On the issue of estoppel
in this context generally, see R PERRY SRNTELL, JR., THE DocmNz OF ESOPPEL IN GEORGIA
LocAL Govma rrNT LAw (1985).
80. 195 Ga. App. at 68, 392 S.E.2d at 285. The court also declared unavailing plaintiffs'
claim in quantum meruit, reasoning that they introduced evidence only of their costs but
nothing showing value received by the municipality. Id.
81. 196 Ga. App. 870, 397 S.E.2d 133 (1990).
82. At the invitation of the mayor, the officer first resigned, then attempted to revoke
the resignation, and charged as breach of contract the municipality's rejection of the revocation and termination of his employment. Id. at 871, 397 S.E.2d at 134.
83. Id. at 872, 397 S.E.2d at 135. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's summary
judgment in favor of the municipality. Id.
84. Precise v. City of Rossville, 261 Ga. 210, 403 S.E.2d 47 (1991).
85. Id. at 211, 403 S.E.2d at 49. The court did hold, however, that plaintiff's tort claim
could not be dismissed on grounds of ante litem notice. Id., 403 S.E.2d at 49.
86. 196 Ga. App. 138, 395 S.E.2d 385 (1990).
87. The contract stated the maximum cost of the job and specified that any change in
the sum could be made only by a duly executed change order. Id. at 138, 395 S.E.2d at 385.
88. The municipality argued noncompliance with the change order procedure, and the
contractor maintained that all changes were made by authorized municipal officials who
agreed to wait until the project was 'completed to resolve the increases. Id. at 139, 395
S.E.2d at 386.
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also disagreed upon applicability of the arbitration clause." Thus, upon
an arbitration panel's award of slightly less than the contractor's full
claim, the municipality charged the panel with overstepping its authority.'0 Affirming the trial judge's confirmation of the award, the court of
appeals ferreted from the record the following conclusion: "The dispute
between the parties involved the meaning, interpretation and application
of certain terms of the contract and these were matters for the arbitrators
to determine."' 1
E. Legislation
In the interpretation of local government legislative enactments, courts
generally will not consider evidence of legislators' "motives" and "intent"
in determining "legislative intent."' The materiality of this general principle in a peculiar factual setting made for one of the more intriguing
facets of the survey period.
The context was the unlikely one of condemnation. Fulton County v.
Dangerfield" encompassed a condemnor's appeal from the trial judge's
admission of condemnees' evidence of the property's "extra value" as a
site for an advertising sign.' That evidence was based on statements by
participants in a hearing that concluded in a municipality's denial of a
sign permit for the property." The court of appeals sustained admissibil89. The Georgia Supreme Court had previously determined, without opinion, that the
claim was the proper subject of arbitration. Id.
90. The municipality relied upon O.C.G.A. § 9-9-93(b)(3), which provides that an arbitration award shall be vacated if the court finds that the arbitrators overstepped their authority. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-9-93(b)(3) (1982)).
91. 196 Ga. App. at 140, 395 S.E.2d at 387.
The arbitrators having resolved the dispute in favor of appellee, the trial court
considered the record of the arbitration proceedings and determined that neither
the contract terms nor the applicable law had been ignored by the arbitrators. Our
review of the record reveals no error in the trial court's ruling.

Id.
92. For treatment of this principle, see generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., "Motive" and
"Intent" in Statutory Interpretation:Their Role in Georgia Local Government Law, UR-

BAN GA., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 9.
93.

195 Ga. App. 208, 393 S.E.2d 285 (1990).

94. Id. at 208-09, 393 S.E.2d at 285. A county had condemned the property for use as a
transit station. On local government condemnation generally, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Condemning Local Government Condemnation, 39 MEmtcm L. Rzv. 11 (1987).
95.

195 Ga. App. at 208-09, 393 S.E.2d at 285. "The opinion was that, since all require-

ments had been met but MARTA had advised the city that the property was being condemned, the permit was denied for this reason." Id.
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ity of the evidence, reasoning that issuance or denial of a sign permit
"was an administrative ministerial act and not legislative."ss
Granting certiorari, a majority of the supreme court reversed. 7 The
general principle's "underlying rationale" required exclusion of the condemnees' evidence.s8 "If the courts cannot properly rely on the testimony
of the legislators themselves, then speculation by an outsider, based on
hearsay and opinion, is even more inherently unreliable."'' Accordingly,
the court held "the testimony concerning the subjective intent of the legislative body of the [municipality] was inadmissible."' 00
F. Property
It was in the setting of eminent domain that the supreme court canvassed some of the most basic (and important) principles of state and
local government law. Background for the episode encompassed the
court's 1985 decision denying the State Department of Transportation
power to condemn municipal property.10 ' In apparent response, the legislature enacted statutes purporting to supply the missing authority.'
Those statutes created the State Commission on the Condemnation of
Public Property, comprised the Commission of executive-branch officials, 03 and required Commission approval of all state-agency condemnations of public property.'" Accordingly, the statutes assumed red-flag
prominence for municipal challenge.
The challenge materialized in Department of Transportationv. City of
Atlanta,'0 ' a broad spectrum assault of constitutional complexion.,"s Es96. Id. at 209, 393 S.E.2d at 286. "Statements of representatives of MARTA, the entity
for whose benefit the property was being condemned, and statements of city employees involved in the permitting process formed part of the basis for the witness' opinion of the
reason for the denial, and it was admissible." Id. Chief Judge Carley, joined by Judge Dean
and Presiding Judge Banks, dissented. Id. at 211, 393 S.E.2d at 287 (Carley, C.J., Deen &
Banke, JJ., dissenting).
97. Fulton County v. Dangerfield, 260 Ga. 665, 398 S.E.2d 14 (1990).
98. Id. at 666, 398 S.E.2d at 15. The court quoted from one of the historic cases expressing the doctrine, Stewart v. Atlanta Beef Co., 93 Ga. 12, 18 S.E. 981 (1893).
99. 260 Ga. at 667, 398 S.E.2d at 15.
100. Id. The court also deemed the testimony hearsay and irrelevant to the land's existing uses. Id. Chief Justice Clarke and Presiding Justice Smith dissented without opinion.
Id. at 668, 398 S.E.2d at 16 (Clarke, C.J. & Smith, J., dissenting).
101. Department of Trans. v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124, 337 S.E.2d 327 (1985).
102. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-16-180 to -183 (1990).
103. Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor, Commissioner of
Insurance, and Commissioner of Labor. Id. § 50-16-181.
104. Id. § 50-16-183(b): "If the Commission determines that the acquisition of the public
property by condemnation is reasonable, necessary, and in the public interest, it shall grant
its approval for such acquisition." Id.
105. 260 Ga. 699, 398 S.E.2d 567 (1990).
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sentially, the attack charged executive branch exercise of a legislative
power. 107 In requiring Commission approval of eminent domain, challenger elaborated, the statute violated the Georgia Constitution's mandate of separation of powers'" and its proscription on delegating legislative power. ' " The trial judge agreed on both scores.110
Initially, the supreme court emphasized that neither constitutional provision could operate in a vacuum. 1 The "controlling issue," the court
proffered, was whether the statute contained "sufficient guidelines for the
Commission to follow." '' The statute required that the Commission base
its approval on a determination of the "public interest" ' s and that the
approved condemnation then advance under applicable eminent domain
procedures.1 1 ' Those prerequisites constituted sufficient "guidelines," the
court concluded, and the Commission's authority "does not amount to an
improper delegation of legislative power and does not violate separationof-powers principles."'11I Reversing the decision below, therefore, the
106. The case arose from Commission approval of the DOT's condemnation of municipal
parks for constructing the Presidential Parkway. Id. at 699, 398 S.E.2d at 567.
107. All parties conceded that condemnation is a legislative power. Id. at 702 n.1, 398
S.E.2d at 570 n.1.
108. GA. CONST.art. I, § 2, para. 3. The Georgia Constitution provides in pertinent part
as follows: "The legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever remain separate and
distinct; and no person discharging the duties of one shall at the same time exercise the
functions of either of the others except as herein provided." Id.
109. GA. CONST. art. III, § 1, para. 1. The Georgia Constitution provides in pertinent part
as follows: "The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a General Assembly which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." Id.
110. 260 Ga. at 705, 398 S.E.2d at 572-73. On these issues generally, see R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Delegation in Georgia Local Government Law, 7 GA. ST. BJ. 9 (1970), reprintedin P.
SEmTLL, STUDms, supra note 1, at 731; see also R.Perry Sentell, Jr., Delineating Delegation in Georgia Local Government Law, URSB GA., June 1988, at 23 and G&-CouN'n GovMENr 19 (Sept. 1989).
111. The court reasoned that "in our complex society," the general assembly "cannot
find all facts and make all applications of legislative policy." 260 Ga. at 703, 398 S.E.2d at
571.
112, Id. If so, "the executive official or commission is not 'exercisting] the functions of'
the legislature, in that it is not making a purely legislative decision, but is acting administratively pursuant to the direction of the legislature." Id. (quoting GA. CONsT. art. I, § 2,
para. 3).
113. O.C.G.A. § 50-16-183(b) (1982). In making that determination, the Commission
must "consider whether the current public use of the property or the proposed public use of
the property is more in the public interest." 260 Ga. at 703, 398 S.E.2d at 572.
114. O.C.G.A. § 50-16-183(c) (1990).
115. 260 Ga. at 704, 398 S.E.2d at 572. The court also rejected a procedural due process
contention: "[W]e can see no constitutional basis for the argument that more process is due
when public property is involved than when private property is involved." Id. Thus, the
property owner is entitled to no notice or opportunity to be heard. Likewise, the court
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court proclaimed state agencies sufficiently armed to condemn municipal
property."s
G. Liability
Frequently, it is claimed, the municipal government's engine sputters,
resulting in manifold harms and inconveniences. Suits arising from these
117
asserted governmental glitches constitute staples of this annual survey.
Georgia's traditional approach to the issue found classic exposition in
11 Plaintiff charged that muMayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Radford.L
nicipal employees interferred with her husband's funeral at the municipal
cemetery. The trial judge rejected plaintiff's claim for damages, holding
municipal operation of the cemetery a "governmental function.", 1 Reversing, the court of appeals reasoned that "[i]nsofar as there continue to
be lots sold for burial purposes and related services provided," operation
of the cemetery constituted "a ministerial function." 120 Reversing the
court of appeals, a majority of the supreme court delved into the unique
history of the cemetery,"' concluding that over time its "lesser function"
of burial had "merged with and into" its "greater function" of "cultural,
historical, and recreational purposes for the general public.

12

2

That

turned aside substantive due process arguments, holding that the statute provided the Commission with adequate authority to make a reasoned decision. Id.
116. Id. at 704-05, 398 S.E.2d at 572-73. Forcefully dissenting, Presiding Justice Smith
urged that the statute created "an impermissible delegation of legislative authority" in failing to mark out sufficiently the limits of the power it purported to grant; and that under the
separation of powers command, "[miembers of the executive branch of state government are
constitutionally prohibited from making final legislative decisions regarding the condemnation of public property." Id. at 709-10, 398 S.E.2d at 575 (Smith, J., dissenting).
In a separate dissent, Justice Hunt also emphasized the nonexistence of guidelines. Id. at
710, 398 S.E.2d at 575 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
117. See generally R. Pxany SEimLL, Jx, THm LAW OF MumcAL TORT LmIrrY iN
GEoRGiA (4th ed. 1988) (The study traces the history of municipal tort liability generally
and analyzes the current state of the law in Georgia).
118. 261 Ga. 129, 401 S.E.2d 709 (1991).
119. Id. at 129-30, 401 S.E.2d at 709. Accordingly, the trial court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment on grounds of municipal tort immunity. Id. See O.C.G.A. §
36-33-1 (1987). For treatment of the "function test" approach to determining municipal responsibility, see R. PERRY SENTELL, J., THE LAW OF MUNicIPAL TORT LIABELTmINGEoRGIA
6-46 (1972).
120. Radford v. Mayor & Alderman of Savannah, 194 Ga. App. 839, 839, 392 S.E.2d 23,

24 (1990).
121. 261 Ga. at 130-31, 401 S.E.2d at 710. Because of that uniqueness, the court was able
to distinguish and preserve City of Atlanta v. Rich, 64 Ga. App. 193, 12 S.E.2d 436 (1940).
261 Ga. at 130-31, 401 S.E.2d at 710.
122. 261 Ga. at 130-31, 401 S.E.2d at 710.
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merger, the court held, converted operation of the cemetery into a "governmental function."1 5
14
Receiving far less judicial solicitude, Pinkston v. City of Albany 1
arose from plaintiff's arrest by municipal police officers.' " First, the court
rejected a lack-of-probable-cause contention, observing that "by plaintiff's own statement, he was at a fire in a public place, with alcohol, displaying a weapon, and he refused to put out the fire." 12s Second, the court
discounted a claim for the violation of civil rights:12 7 Plaintiff "has not
even alleged that any of the asserted wrongs committed against him resulted from . . . an intentionally corrupt or impermissible policy on the

part of the

city. 1' 3 5

Finally, on plaintiff's slander charge, the court re-

sponded that "truth is a perfect defense." '
The survey period encompassed two instances of municipal "nuisance"
liability."' 0 In City of Lawrenceville v. Heard,s1 the court affirmed a
homeowner's judgment for the -continuing nuisance of excessive water
runoff.12 2 With evidence of increased drainage from municipally approved
subdivisions, as well as municipal failure to maintain upstream culverts,
123. Id. Accordingly, the court held the municipality immune from tort liability in the
case. Id. In his dissent, Presiding Justice Smith "violently disagree[d]" 'with the majority
and characterized the "governmental" classification of the cemetery "a figment of someone's
imagination totally lacking support in the record." Id. at 135-36, 401 S.E.2d at 713 (Smith,
J., dissenting). Justice Hunt dissented on grounds that although the cemetery served both
governmental and ministerial purposes, plaintiff's alleged injury arose from the latter, and
there should be no immunity in regard to it. Id. at 136, 401 S.E.2d at 714 (Hunt, J.,
dissenting).
124. 196 Ga. App. 43, 395 S.E.2d 587 (1990).
125. Id. at 44, 395 S.E.2d at 588. Plaintiff sued the municipality and seven members of
the police department. Id.
126. Id. at 44-46, 395 S.E.2d at 588-90. Thus, plaintiff's own version admitted enough,
the court reasoned, to exclude the claim of an arrest based on personal spite and desire to
injure under O.C.G.A. §§ 51-7-2 and 51-7-3. 196 Ga. App. at 46, 395 S.E.2d at 590.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). For treatment, see R. PERRY SRNTm., JE., GEORGIA LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW'S ASSIMILATION OF Monell: SECTION 1983 AND THE NEw "PERSONS" (1984).
128. 196 Ga. App. at 47, 395 S.E.2d at 590.
129. Id. Plaintiff alleged slander as a result of the officer's statement that he was being
arrested for attempted escape. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants. Id., 395 S.E.2d at 591.
130. For treatment of municipal nuisance liability, see R. PERRY SENTELL, Ja., THE LAW
OF MubcwAL TORT LAmi iN GEORGIA 117-34 (1988); see also R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal Liability in Georgia:The "Nuisance"Nuisance, 12 GA. ST. B J. 11 (1975), reprinted
in P. SzNTELL, STuwns, supra note 1, at 843.
131. 194 Ga. App. 580, 391 S.E.2d 441 (1990).
132. Id. at 583, 391 S.E.2d at 444. Plaintiff claimed damages for property erosion, flooding of his basement, warped floors, and cracks in chimney and foundation. Id. at 580-81, 391
S.E.2d at 442-43.
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the court could detect no reason for reversal.."" Similarly, in City of Atlanta v.Murphy,'" the court affirmed a property owner's judgment for
nuisance resulting from municipal operation of a landfill.135 Initially, the
court rejected municipal protests of "double recovery": "Damages for discomfort and annoyance caused to the owner and his family are separate
and distinct from damage to the value of the realty."1 0 The court also
refused to accept the contention that, because plaintiff remained on the
property, the damages were excessive. The fact that plaintiff was willing
to put up with the nuisance did not preclude recovery for the resulting
damages.""'

Concluding the survey period's asserted glitches, City of Atlanta v. J.A.
Jones Construction Co.155 projected direct (and dynamic) conflict between (and within) the appellate courts. The case arose from municipal
acceptance of a late bid for construction of a parking deck.1 39 Plaintiff,
lowest timely bidder, sued the municipality under both state law (lost
profits) and federal law (denial of due process). 40 At trial, the jury found
133. Id. at 582-83, 391 S.E.2d at 444. Although both parties produced expert testimony,
the court held that the only issue on appeal was whether there was "any evidence" in sup-

port of the verdict and judgment. Id. at 582, 391 S.E.2d at 444. The court also affirmed
judgment n.o.v. for the municipality on the point of punitive damages. Id. at 583, 391 S.E.2d
at 444. The court rejected as "without merit" plaintiff's contention that "attorney fees are
recoverable in nuisance actions against municipalities even absent proof of bad faith or
other grounds delineated in OCGA sec. 13-6-11." Id. The court distinguished the supreme
court's decision in City of Columbus v. Myszka, 246 Ga. 571, 272 S.E.2d 302 (1980), on the
ground that a statute authorized the jury's verdict in that case. 194 Ga. App. at 583, 391
S.E.2d at 444.
134. 194 Ga. App. 652, 391 S.E.2d 474 (1990).
135. Id. at 654, 391 S.E.2d at 477. Plaintiff claimed damages for odors, pests, and wild
animals and obtained separate verdicts and judgments for loss of rental value, damages, and
attorney fees. Id. at 652, 391 S.E.2d at 476.
136. Id. at 653, 391 S.E.2d at 476. "In an action for nuisance, the plaintiff may recover
for both damage to person and damage to property." Id.
137. Id. at 654, 391 S.E.2d at 477. The court also upheld the award for attorney fees on
the ground that plaintiff presented evidence of municipal bad faith. Id. at 653-54, 391
S.E.2d at 476-77.
138. 260 Ga. 658, 398 S.E.2d 369 (1990).
139. Id. at 658, 398 S.E.2d at 370. Specified closing time for bids was 2:00 p.m.; the
contested bid was received at 2:03 p.m., after the municipality had announced that no other
bids would be accepted; another bid, submitted between 2:05 and 2:10 p.m., was rejected as
untimely; all bids were for over $13,000,000; and the late contested bid was $10,500 less than
plaintiff's bid. City of Atlanta v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 195 Ga. App. 72, 72-73, 392 S.E.2d
564, 566, rev'd, 260 Ga. 658, 398 S.E.2d 369 (1990).
140. 260 Ga. at 658, 398 S.E.2d at 370. The latter claim was asserted under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and grounded upon municipal failure to afford plaintiff a hearing on its complaint
concerning acceptance of the late bid. Id.
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sizeable awards on both counts,
and the trial court entered judgment; the
14
court of appeals affirmed. 1
A majority of the supreme court reversed both awards. 14' Although approving the frustrated bidder's right to "appropriate relief,"'14 the court
unfurled the "purpose" of the bid process: to protect public coffers and to
assure taxpayers quality work at lowest possible price.1 " In the court's
view, those objectives limited plaintiff's recovery to "reasonable costs of
bid preparation. ' 14 Recovery for lost profits would "unduly punish the
tax-paying public while compensating the plaintiffs for effort they did not
make and risks they did not take. 1 4 The explicated rationale also precluded plaintiff's due process recovery. Thus, municipal failure to afford a
hearing resulted only in plaintiff's loss of the contract, and recovery for
that wrong was (again) the expense of bid preparation. An additional
award under
federal law would constitute "impermissible double
1' 47
recovery.

Although the five-justice majority opinion took pains to specify that
personal liability was not in issue,148 four of those justices joined in a concurring opinion.148 Their announced purpose was "to suggest the possibilities of additional relief . . . as might avail for a proper case in the
future." 1 0 Both suggestions focused on liability of the officials themselves.1 51 First, the concurrence noted the "long-standing distinction, in
cases of official immunity, between ministerial and discretionary functions as to negligent acts of public officials."'' Second (and "[m]ore im141. Id.
142. Id. at 658-60, 398 S.E.2d at 370.71.
143. Id. at 659, 398 S.E.2d at 370.
144. Id. at 658, 398 S.E.2d at 370.
145. Id. at 659, 398 S.E.2d at 370. That cost was established at trial to be $22,125.05. Id.,
398 S.E.2d at 371.
146. Id. "Limiting recovery to reasonable bid preparation costs is keeping with the legitimate governmental objective of rewarding the lowest qualified bidder and guarding against
public officials shirking their duties while, at the same time, preventing unwarranted waste
of taxpayers' money." Id.
147. Id. The court directed the trial judge to enter judgment for plaintiff in the amount
of $22,125.05, with interest. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 660-61, 398 S.E.2d at 371-72 (Clarke, C.J., Weltner, Bell & Hunt, JJ., concurring). Justice Weltner wrote the opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Clarke and Justices
Bell and Hunt. Id.
160. Id. at 660, 398 S.E.2d at 371 (Clarke, C.J., Weltner, Bell & Hunt, JJ., concurring).
151. See generally R. Perry Sentel, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officers: Rights for
Their Wrongs, 13 GA. L. RV. 747 (1979), reprinted in P. SENTELL, ADDITIONAL STUDIES,
supra note 1, at 419; see also R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Individual Liability in Georgia Local
Government Law: The Haunting Hiatus of Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. Rav. 27 (1988).
152. 260 Ga. at 660, 398 S.E.2d at 371 (Clarke, C.J., Weltner, Bell & Hunt, JJ., concurring). "'[Where there is no self-insurance fund, the distinction between ministerial and
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portant"), 15 "fraud and corruption on the part of a public official resulting in the unlawful award of a publicly-bid contract
1 may subject the
fraudulent and corrupt official to personal liability." "
H. Zoning
Traditionally, local government zoning provides exception for the special instance of a "nonconforming use." Discontinuation of such a "use"
claimed the supreme court's attention in Ansley House, Inc. v.City of
Atlanta.155 The controversy arose from the municipality's revocation of a
business license for nonconforming premises. 15s Under its ordinance, the
municipality maintained that discontinuation for a continuous period 157
of
one year had destroyed the permissibility of the nonconforming use.
Plaintiff countered that his acquisition of the property within the year,
and his acts in restoring its condition, retained the "use" status.'" A majority of the court accepted plaintiff's position, holding the ordinance to
create only a "rebuttable presumption" of abandonment-a presumption
sufficiently rebutted by plaintiff's actions.15 ' Those actions presented
"convincing evidence of an intent not to abandon the nonconforming
use," the court reasoned, and tolled the running of the ordinance's "fordiscretionary acts is still viable in ruling on immunity for public officials for liability for
their negligent acts."' Id. (quoting Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206, 206, 392 S.E.2d 235, 236
(1990)).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 661, 398 S.E.2d at 372. Presiding Justice Smith, in a forceful dissenting opinion, urged that the issue of personal liability should be addressed, and that the judgments
against the municipality should be affirmed. Id. at 662, 398 S.E.2d at 373 (Smith, J., dissenting). A second dissent, by Justice Fletcher, took the opposite approach, urging that the
breach was only de minimis and that municipal officials should be allowed discretion to
award the contract to the lowest bidder. Id. at 665, 398 S.E.2d at 375 (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting).
155. 260 Ga. 540, 397 S.E.2d 419 (1990).
156. Id. at 540, 397 S.E.2d at 419. The municipality had revoked the former owner's
business license to operate a rooming house (the nonconforming use) because of housing,
building, and electrical code violations. Plaintiffs later purchased the property with the understanding that its nonconforming use status continued, only to experience subsequent municipal revocation of the status. Id. at 540-42, 397 S.E.2d at 419-20.
157. Id. at 541, 397 S.E.2d at 420. I.e., after that period of discontinuation, the premises
could not be used "except in conformity with the regulations of the district in which it is
located." Id. (quoting ATt rrA, GA., ZomNG Oi.Nl~cn § 16-24.005(5) (1980)).
158. Id. at 540-41, 397 S.E.2d at 419-20. Those acts included "obtaining a building permit, beginning renovations, applying for a business license, and obtaining a temporary certificate of occupancy." Id. at 543, 397 S.E.2d at 421.
159. Id. "Appellant has presented ample evidence of a series of closely connected overt
acts, occurring months prior to the expiration of the period specified in the ordinance, which
rebut that presumption." Id.
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feiture period."'" Upon restoration of the property, therefore, plaintiff

was entitled to continuation of its nonconforming use status.'"
More procedural in complexion, City of Atlanta v. Cates ss featured a
rezoning effort by landowners who had failed at such an effort some three
years earlier.'" Assessing the municipality's defense of res judicata, a majority of the supreme court denied one of its prior decisions "to mean that
a simple change in the rezoning application creates a new cause of action." ' " Plaintiffs could nevertheless avoid res judicata by demonstrating
"a change in the circumstances affecting the use of the land," a change
rendering the present zoning classification unconstitutional." Plaintiffs'
affidavits created "a genuine issue of fact" in that respect,' the court
held, rendering res judicata, as a matter of law, inapplicable.' 76
II.
A.

COUNTIES

Powers

The survey period's power controversies tended toward intra-county
administrative disagreements over the reach of the county commissioners'
authority. The supreme court drew the lines of resolution, yielding results
that juxtaposed themselves in an interesting pattern.
In McCorkle v. Bignault,1s disagreement centered on the financial authority of the commission's chairman. Specifically, the chairman claimed
approval power over attorney fee requests submitted by the tripartite
160. Id. "The fact that appellant has no business license to operate the property as a
rooming house, and could not apply for such license until one year after the date of the
previous license's revocation, is irrelevant so long as there is, as here, ample evidence of the
owner's intent not to abandon the nonconforming use prior to expiration of the specified
period." Id.
161. Id. Justices Weltner, Hunt, and Benham dissented, asserting that the former
owner's intent not to abandon could not be transferred to the successor owners. Id. at 54344, 397 S.E.2d at 421-23 (Weltner, Hunt & Benham, JJ., dissenting).
162. 260 Ga. 772, 399 S.E.2d 474 (1991).
163. Id. at 772-73, 399 S.E.2d at 475.
164. Id. at 773, 399 S.E.2d at 475. This was the meaning the municipality attributed to
Trend Dev. Corp. v. Douglas County, 259 Ga. 425, 383 S.E.2d 123 (1989). The court reasoned that Trend was limited to its specific facts. 260 Ga. at 773, 399 S.E.2d at 475.
165. 260 Ga. at 773, 399 S.E.2d at 475. "A classification that was constitutional in 1985
or 1987 might not be constitutional now." Id.
166. Id. The court also disagreed with the municipal contention that Trend required
that all affirmative defenses must be raised before the zoning board. Id. at 774, 399 S.E.2d
at 475.
167. Id. at 773, 399 S.E.2d at 475. The court thus affirmed the trial judge in denying the
municipality's motion for summary judgment. Justices Bell, Hunt, and Fletcher dissented.
Id. at 774, 399 S.E.2d at 475-76 (Bell, Hunt & Fletcher, JJ., dissenting).
168. 260 Ga. 758, 399 S.E.2d 916 (1991).
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committee managing the county's indigent defense program.16 ' Upon
challenge, the court found the chairman's approval of county disbursements "merely a matter of custom" not mandated by ordinance.170 The
county's voluntary participation in the state-funded indigent defense program bound the county to program guidelines. 1" Those guidelines "provide for a procedure that is independent of the county except to the extent of the county's representatives on the tripartite committee." 17
'
Consequently, the court sustained an order enjoining the chairman's approval of attorney fee requests. 173
In contrast, the court in Board of Commissioners of Randolph County
v. Wilson" upheld the challenged power. Specifically, the court rejected
175
the county sheriff's charge that by reducing his previous year's budget,

the commissioners were invading his statutory power to appoint deputies.176 The court countered by emphasizing the commissioners' statutory
duty to approve deputy salaries. 7 7 Exercise of that duty, the court rea-

soned, neither abolished positions nor encroached on appointment.17 '
That the reduced budget may require the sheriff to "adjust" the number
and compensation of deputies failed to demonstrate the commissioners'
17
abuse of discretion. '

169. Id. at 758-59, 399 S.E.2d at 916-17. The committee is required by O.C.G.A. § 17-1237 (1990); it had selected a panel of local attorneys to whom indigent cases were assigned on
a rotating basis. The chairman claimed power to review and approve all requests for payment of attorney fees in excess of $999. 260 Ga. at 758-59, 399 S.E.2d at 916-17.
170. 260 Ga. at 760, 399 S.E.2d at 917.
171. Id. The program is authorized and structured by O.C.G.A. §§ 17-12-30 to -62
(1990). 260 Ga. at 758, 399 S.E.2d at 916.
172. 260 Ga. at 760, 399 S.E.2d at 917.
173. Id. at 761, 399 S.E.2d at 918. The court limited the injunction "to the issue of funds
allocated for indigent defense." Id.
174. 260 Ga. 482, 396 S.E.2d 903 (1990).
175. Id. at 482, 396 S.E.2d at 904. The sheriff requested an aggregate sum to pay five
deputies' salaries, and the commissioners budgeted a lesser aggregate sum. Id.
176. O.C.G.A. § 15-16-23 (1990). Local statutes also conferred the appointment power
upon the sheriff. 260 Ga. at 482, 396 S.E.2d at 903-04.
177. 260 Ga. at 483, 396 S.E.2d at 904. "Indeed, the commission's power to approve the
deputy sheriffs' salaries is recognized in the emphasized language of the local act." Id. (footnote omitted).
178. Id. The court disagreed with the trial judge's interpretation that the commissioners
must budget deputies on a line-item basis. "By approving or disapproving the sherifs
budget request for salaries, whether done separately or as a lump sum, the commissioners
have performed their duty under the language of the act." Id.
179. Id., 396 S.E.2d at 904-05. The court denied that the commissioners' budgeting process crossed over into discharging the sheriff's deputies. "We view this case, however, as
involving the power of the commission to approve the sheriff's budget rather than the power
of the sheriff to hire deputies." Id. at 484, 396 S.E.2d at 905.
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B. Officers and Employees
In an unusually wide array of contexts, county employment issues
reared their countenances during this survey period. Balkcom v. Jones
County'"1 featured compensation claims of two former county commissioners recalled from office in 1982. On grounds of the recall statute's unconstitutionality, plaintiffs sought recovery for unpaid salaries and benefits. 1 Because plaintiffs' periods of entitlement expired at the end of
1984, however, the court of appeals held the claims statutorily
foreclosed.'"
Likewise resolved on statutory grounds, Diefenderfer v. Pierce"s focused upon prerequisites for the position of assistant to the county's chief
executive. Those prerequisites included a college degree "and ... at least
five years of experience in" various capacities "or any combination
thereof."'1 " The supreme court held the "or any combination thereof"
language exclusively applicable to the experience portion of the requirement.18' Accordingly, the court granted a petition for quo warranto,holding that one needed a college degree regardless of experience.'"
In Madden v.Bellew,'" the appellate courts themselves disagreed over
expiration of the county attorney's term of employment.18 ' Attention focused on statutes authorizing the commission chairman's employment of
personnel "with the concurrence and approval of a majority of the members of the board."1" Rejecting the court of appeals position that employment terminated when newly elected commissioners took office,1' 0 the su180. 196 Ga. App. 378, 395 S.E.2d 889 (1990).
181. Id. at 378, 395 S.E.2d at 890. The recall took place under O.C.G.A. § 21-4-1. Id.For
treatment of the subject, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Remembering Recall in Local Government Law, 10 GA. L.Rav. 883 (1976), reprinted in P. SENTEL, ADDmONAL STUDIS, supra
note 1, at 327.
182. 196 Ga. App. at 379, 395 S.E.2d at 890. The statute requires that actions for the
recovery of wages "shall be brought within two years after the right of action has accrued."
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 (1982)). The court affirmed the trial judge's decision for the
county. Id.
183. 260 Ga. 426, 396 S.E.2d 227 (1990).
184. Id. at 426, 396 S.E.2d'at 227-28 (quoting 1981 Ga. Laws 4304, 4321).
185. Id. at 427, 396 S.E.2d at 228.
186. Id. For treatment of this popular action in the local government context, see R.

PmY

SzNTzLL, Ja, THE WRIT OF Quo WARRANTO IN GEoRGA LoCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

(1987).
187. 260 Ga. 530, 397 S.E.2d 687 (1990).
188. For a second issue of considerably more importance, see infra text accompanying
notes 226-45.
189. 1988 Ga. Laws 4692, 4697.
190. The new board took office in January 1989, and the commissioners' defeat of the
chairman's recommendation to continue the previous attorney occurred on January 24,
1989. In March, plaintiffs (three commissioners) instituted this action. Madden v. Bellew,
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preme court feared that "county governments would be subject to
considerable turmoil after every election in which new commissioners
were elected." 9" Accordingly, the court held that the county attorney's
term expired only when "a majority of the county commission withdrew
approval of his employment." '
Burbridge v. Hensley1" involved the correct procedure for bringing a
sheriff's department within the county civil service system.'" The court
of appeals viewed the authorizing statute to mandate two county ordinances: first, an ordinance creating a county civil service commission; second, a subsequent ordinance authorizing departments to apply for coverage. ' 1 The court held that the county's failure to adopt the second
ordinance invalidated an interim sheriff's application for his department's
coverage.'" Accordingly, the civil service commission possessed no jurisdiction over the sheriff's department nor any power to order a former
employee's reinstatement and back pay.197
Finally, Lundy v. State s presented an indicted district attorney's investigator's claim to specified grand jury protections statutorily conferred
upon "peace officers." 1 " The court disputed neither defendant's status as
a covered peace officer nor the fact of his employment when the alleged
acts occurred. 00 However, the indictment followed by several months defendant's discharge from his position. "Given that the purpose of the
statute is to prevent officials from being distracted from the performance
195 Ga. App. 131, 131, 393 S.E.2d 31, 32, rev'd, 260 Ga. 530, 397 S.E.2d 687 (1990). The
court of appeals held that the attorney's term of employment ended upon the expiration of
the terms of the chairman and commissioners who appointed him. 195 Ga. App. at 132, 393
S.E.2d at 33.
191. 260 Ga. at 531, 397 S.E.2d at 688.
192. Id. at 531, 397 S.E.2d at 689. That is, when the commissioners defeated the chairman's recommendation. Id.
193. 194 Ga. App. 523, 391 S.E.2d 5 (1990).
194. Id. at 523-25, 391 S.E.2d at 5-7. The action was grounded upon the civil service
commission's affirmance of a grievance committee's recommendation of reinstatement and
back pay for a former department employee. Id. at 523, 391 S.E.2d at 6.
195. Id. at 524, 391 S.E.2d at 6 (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21 (1987 & Supp. 1991)).
196. Id. at 525, 391 S.E.2d at 7.
197. Id., 391 S.E.2d at 6-7. The court affirmed the trial judge's summary judgment in
favor of the noncomplying sheriff. Id., 391 S.E.2d at 7.
198. 195 Ga. App. 682, 394 S.E.2d 559 (1990).
199. Id. at 682, 394 S.E.2d at 560. Those rights include receiving a copy of the indictment before it is presented to the grand jury, the right to appear, with counsel, before the
grand jury, and the right to make a sworn statement. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-52, 45-114 (1990)). For treatment of these protections in local government law, see R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Georgia Local Government Officials and the Grand Jury, 26 G& ST. BJ. 50 (1989).
200. 195 Ga. App. at 682, 394 S.E.2d at 560. Defendant had been convicted on nine
counts of bribery and three counts of theft by taking for acts that occurred while he was the
district attorney's investigator. Id.
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of their duties while they defend themselves against baseless charges,''0
to one no longer an officer
the court refused to extend the protections
0
when the proceedings commenced.2 2
C. Regulation
Few subjects better illustrate the multi-faceted issues of local government regulation than that of licensing. 03 Cook v. Cobb County'0 ' featured
03
that subject via a challenge to county revocation of a sign permit. Sustaining the challenge, the supreme court emphasized an ordinance requiring that permit revocation be effected by "'the zoning administrator or
the county's designee."'" The official who revoked challenger's permit
was neither the administrator nor possessed of written county authorization. The court discounted the official's claim of verbal delegation,207 invalidated the revocation, and declared challenger entitled to construct a
sign. s
The permit power fared no better in Dinsmore Development Co. v.
0
Cherokee County,'2
involving an appeal from county denial of a landfill
1
0
permit.2 Examining the material ordinance, the court inquired whether
a general statement of "purposes" provided the county board with sufficient "guidelines" for regulating landfills.' 1 ' Characterizing the statement
201. Id. at 683, 394 S.E.2d at 561.
202. Id. Additionally, the court held the evidence sufficient to support defendant's convictions. Id. at 683-84, 394 S.E.2d at 561-62.
203. See generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Discretionin Georgia Local Government Law, 8
GA. L. REV.614 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Reasoning by Riddle: The Power to Prohibitin
Georgia Local Government Law, 9 GA. L. REv. 115 (1974). These articles are reprinted in P.
SENTEL STumns, supra note 1, at 651, 693; see also R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law and Liquor Licensing:A Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L. REV. 1039 (1981), reprinted
in P. SENTELL, ADDITIONAL STUDIES, supra note 1, at 283.
204. 260 Ga. 633, 397 S.E.2d 921 (1990).
205. Id. at 634, 397 S.E.2d at 921. Challengers abandoned the original sign site, failed in
their attempt to obtain a new site, and suffered revocation of their original permit because
of the erection of another sign within a prohibited distance. Id.
206. Id., 397 S.E.2d at 922 (citing Con COUNTY, GA., ORDINANCE § 14(B)(1)(a)).
207. Id. at 635, 397 S.E.2d at 922. The court said, "There was no substantive proof of a
delegation of the power to revoke sign permits." Id.
208. Id. The court reversed the trial judge's decision to the contrary and dismissed both
a permanent injunction and an award of fines. Id. Justice Benham dissented without opinion. Id. (Benham, J., dissenting).
209. 260 Ga. 727, 398 S.E.2d 539 (1990).
210. Id. at 727, 398 S.E.2d at 539. Plaintiffs sought a permit from the county board of
zoning adjustment for a landfill on agriculturally zoned land and appealed the board's denial. Id.
211.

Id. at 727-29, 398 S.E.2d at 539 (citing CHEROKEn COUNTY, GA, ZONING ORDINANCE,

Art. X, § E(3), (g)(8)). Plaintiffs contended that the ordinance lacked objective guidelines
upon which the board could base its denial of a permit. Id. at 727, 398 S.E.2d at 539. The
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as only one "of general goals and purposes,"'' the court held it devoid of
criteria or objective standards.' 1 ' Accordingly,
plaintiffs prevailed in their
1
pursuit of the special use permit.' '
The period's regulatory fixation upon waste disposal continued apace in
Mayor & Aldermen of Forsyth v. Monroe County. 1 5 The case encompassed a county's effort to prohibit waste disposal at a municipal landfill
located in an unincorporated area. Because the subject waste would originate outside the county, argument revolved around a statute requiring
county consent to the transaction.'11 The supreme court observed, however, that a federal district court had declared that statute unconstitutional,'2 7 a decision then on appeal to the eleventh circuit. That decision,
the court held, estopped consideration of the statute in this proceeding.21
The remaining cases involved county enforcement of garbage ordinances against individuals. In Hogan v. DeKalb County, 1 1 the court of
appeals upheld enforcement against an owner seeking to collect garbage
from his own apartment complexes and commercial building.20 The court
construed the ordinance to restrict collection efforts to the county or its
licensee, with an exception only for owners of single-family dwelling
statement of purpose contained in the ordinance enumerated such concerns as congestion,
safety, health, general welfare, adequate light and air, transportation, water, sewerage,
schools, parks, desirable living conditions, stability of neighborhoods, and encouraging the
most appropriate use of lands. Id. at 728-29, 398 S.E.2d at 540 (citing CHEROKEE COUNT,
GA., ZONING OmIANCE, Art. I).
212. Id. at 729, 398 S.E.2d at 540.
213. Id. It was not sufficient, the court held, to meet the "applicant of common intelligence" standard required of such regulatory measures. Id. For a discussion of how close that
call can be, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., "Ascertainable Standards" versus "Unbridled Discretion," in Local Government Regulation, GA. CouNTr GOVERNMENT 19 (Dec. 1989); 1 GMA
INFo. SERIS 1 (Jan. 1990).
214. 260 Ga. at 729, 398 S.E.2d at 540. That is, the court reversed the trial judge's decision to the contrary, but held that applicants' right to the permit depended upon meeting
other requirements not yet fulfilled. Id.
215. 260 Ga. 296, 392 S.E.2d 865 (1990).
216. Id. at 296-97, 392 S.E.2d at 865-66 (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-1-16 (1987 & Supp. 1991)).
The statute prohibits the transport of waste across county boundaries for the purpose of
dumping unless permission is first obtained from the county in which the dump is located.

Id.
217. Id. at 297, 392 S.E.2d at 866. That decision, rendered three months after .the trial
judge had ruled in this case, declared the ordinance an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce. Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, Ga., 731 F. Supp. 505 (M.D. Ga 1990),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 939 F.2d 941 (11th Cir. 1991).
218. 260 Ga. at 297, 392 S.E.2d at 866. The court held that estoppel by judgment precluded its consideration of the statute and required reversal of the trial judge, "because
judgments from a federal court remain binding during the pendency of an appeal and are
not suspended." Id.
219. 196 Ga. App. 728, 397 S.E.2d 16 (1990).
220. Id. at 728-29, 397 S.E.2d at 16-17.
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units.'2 ' The individual fared no better in Sliney v.State,'2 the supreme
court's review of a citation issued for removal of refuse from a dumpster."' Rebuffing defendant's attack on the subject ordinance, the court
conceded the measure to be "inartfuilly drafted," but construed as synonymous its terms "waste," "litter," "garbage," and "refuse." '" 4 So interpreted, the ordinance provided adequate standards for the guidance of
those whom it regulated."'2
D.

Contracts

In 1988, the Georgia Supreme Court set the local government law world
on its ear by expressing doubt whether counties remained covered by the
statutory prohibition on "binding contracts.""26 An oddity of codification,

the court indicated, may have restricted the proscription to municipali-

ties."7 In 1990, the court resolved "to confront the issue" in Madden v.

Bellew,'

a case presenting controversy over the duration of a county

commission's appointment of an attorney.' For analysis, the court simply recalled its earlier characterization of the principle as one "'applica-

ble generally to legislative or governmental bodies.'

",230

Summarily re-

221. Id. at 729, 397 S.E.2d at 17. The court thus upheld the trial court's judgment for
the county. Id.
222. 260 Ga. 167, 391 S.E.2d 114 (1990).
223. Id. at 167, 391 S.E.2d at 115.
224. Id. at 168, 391 S.E.2d at 115. "'It shall be unlawful for any person to remove waste
or litter from public containers or to place in such containers any material other than garbage."' Id. at 167, 391 S.E.2d at 115 (quoting LOWNDES COUNTY, GA., CODE § 9.8(d)).
225. Id. at 168, 391 S.E.2d at 115. "This ordinance, whether wise or not, was enacted for
what the county perceived to be health and safety purposes in the exercise of its police
power." Id. (footnote omitted). Presiding Justice Smith, joined by Justice Benham, dissented on grounds that the terms of the ordinance were not sufficiently clear and that the
ordinance conferred unfettered discretion upon the police. Id. at 169-70, 391 S.E.2d at 116
(Smith & Benham, JJ., dissenting).
226. Board of Comm'rs of Chatham County v. Chatham Advertisers, 258 Ga. 498, 371
S.E.2d 850 (1988). The applicable statute provides: "One council may not, by an ordinance,
bind itself or its successors so as to prevent free legislation in matters of municipal government." O.C.G.A. § 36-30-3(a) (1987 & Supp. 1991). For a general treatment, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Local Government and Contracts That Bind, 3 GA. L. Rzv. 546 (1969); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in Georgia Local Government Law: Recent Perspectives, 11
GA. ST. B.J. 148 (1975). These articles are reprinted in P. SENTELL, STUDIES, supra note 1, at
541, 579.
227. For treatment of the episode, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in Georgia Local Government Law: Configurations of Codification, 24 GA. L. REv. 95 (1989).
228. 260 Ga. 530, 397 S.E.2d 687 (1990).
229. Id. at 530, 397 S.E.2d at 688. On the point of when the county attorney's employment terminated, see supra text accompanying notes 180-202.
230. 260 Ga. at 531, 397 S.E.2d at 688 (quoting Aven v. Steiner Cancer Hosp., 189 Ga.
126, 5 S.E.2d 356 (1939)).
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moving the suspense, the court reaffirmed applicability of the prohibition
to counties "as fully as it applies to municipalities."' 31
Explicitly authorized county contracts encounter additional prerequisites. Failure to require a contractor's payment bond, for example, renders the county liable for materialman losses on a public works project.'2'
In Kelly Energy Systems, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of Clarke
County,"' the court of appeals considered when such a loss accrued."'
Discounting the significance of a particular letter from contractor to materialman, the court held the latter's claim to "accrue" only upon notice
of the contractor's bankruptcy."' That notice, the court concluded,
started the twelve-month period of time in which the materialman must
in turn provide notice of its claim to the county.'"
On occasion, the supreme court cautions counties on the wisdom of certain (albeit authorized) contracts. In Straughan & Straughan v. Douglas,'

7

the court "questioned the practice of conditioning the appointment

of an attorney to represent an indigent defendant in a death penalty case
upon the payment of a fixed fee, the amount of which has been decided in
advance."'" Nevertheless, "[tihe fact that the [indigent's] case ended
prior to trial does not negate the agreement."' Holding the county responsible for the contract amount,"0 the court emphasized that it would
231. Id. For discussion, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in County Government -Never Mind, GA. CouNrT Gov. 28 (Mar. 1991).
232. O.C.G.A. §§ 13-10-1 (1982 & Supp. 1991), 36-82-102 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
233. 196 Ga. App. 519, 396 S.E.2d 498 (1990).
234. Id. at 520, 396 S.E.2d at 500. The case involved a county contract for roofing work,
county failure to require the contractor to post a bond, contractor's abandonment of job and
filing for bankruptcy, and materialman's effort to recover costs of materials supplied. Id. at
519, 396 S.E.2d at 499-500.
235. Id. at 520-21, 396 S.E.2d at 500. The letter apologized for delay in payment and
requested materialman's patience. The court said it did not signify the contractor's insolvency. Id.
236. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1 (1987)). For treatment of this so-called ante litem
requirement, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Claims Against Counties: The Difference A Year
Makes, 36 MERcER L. Rzv. 1 (1984). "Inasmuch as there was some evidence that [the contractor] was not insolvent on November 17, 1986, we reverse the trial court's grant of a
directed verdict in favor of Clarke County." 196 Ga. App. at 521, 396 S.E.2d at 500.
237. 260 Ga. 821, 400 S.E.2d 906 (1991).
238. Id. at 823, 400 S.E.2d at 907. "The situation presented here is another example of.
why we question and advise the practice." Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. The contract stated a fixed fee and obligated the attorneys to provide all legal
services to an indigent defendant in a death penalty case from outset through all appeals.
The court noted the county's authority to contract for indigent defense in O.C.G.A. § 17-1244 (1990). 260 Ga. at 823, 400 S.E.2d at 907. After the contract was executed, the state
withdrew notice of intent to seek the death penalty, and defendant plead guilty and received a life sentence. Id. at 822, 400 S.E.2d at 906.
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not "now rewrite the agreement [of the parties].""' 1
At a point, the court's caution converts to public policy disdain. Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. Parsons"' featured a county board of tax assessors'
contingency fee contract with a private auditor. Specifically, the auditor
agreed to audit designated personal property tax returns and to receive
compensation fixed at a percentage of additional tax collections." s' Conceding statutory authority for county contracts to "'search out and appraise unreturned properties,' "'" the court condemned the constitutionality of the contingent fee: "Fairness and impartiality are threatened
where a private organization has a financial stake in the amount of tax
collected as a result of the assessment it recommends.'"
E. Property
The period provided appropriately contrasting episodes concerning
county ownership of roads. In Bryant v. Kern & Co.,' an automobile
driver's action for personal injuries" '7 focused on a road dedicated by a
private developer but never formally accepted by the county.2'" Plumbing
the essentials of implied acceptance, the court of appeals noted the
county's approval of the plat, inspection of construction, requirement of a
maintenance bond, and order for an intersection stop sign.2' Those acts
effected the county's implied acceptance
and released the developer from
50
liability for plaintiff's collision.2
In the second instance, Glass v. Carnes,'51 the supreme court held the
county without power to reopen a road which it had previously declared
abandoned.'' Moreover, because the county had never acquired fee sim241. 260 Ga. at 823, 400 S.E.2d at 907. Justice Hunt, joined by Presiding Justice Smith,
dissented. Id., 400 S.E.2d at 908 (Smith & Hunt, JJ., dissenting).
242. 260 Ga. 824, 401 S.E.2d 4 (1991).
243. Id. at 824, 401 S.E.2d at 4. Plaintiff in the case, a "designated tax payer" chosen for
audit, attacked the contract as a "bounty hunter" agreement. Id.
244. Id. at 825, 401 S.E.2d at 4 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 48-5-298(a)(3) (1982)).
245. Id., 401 S.E.2d at 5. The court thus reversed the trial judge's judgment favoring the
validity of the contract. Id.
246. 196 Ga. App. 165, 395 S.E.2d 620 (1990).
247. Id. at 165, 395 S.E.2d at 620. Plaintiff sought to impose liability on the developer
for a missing stop sign, and developer entered a third-party complaint against the county.
Id.
248. Id. at 165-66, 395 S.E.2d at 620. Developer's dedication was undisputed, as was the
lack of a formal county acceptance. Id. at 166-67, 395 S.E.2d at 622.
249. Id. at 167, 395 S.E.2d at 622.
250. Id. at 167-68, 395 S.E.2d at 622. "At the time of the collision, it was incumbent on
the county, not defendants, to erect traffic control devices on [the road]." Id. at 168, 395
S.E.2d at 623.
251. 260 Ga. 627, 398 S.E.2d 7 (1990).
252. Id. at 631, 398 S.E.2d at 10. The court relied upon O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2(b)(1) (1991).
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pie title to the road,'' that land, upon county abandonment, came under
254
the presumptive ownership of the abutting owners.
F. Condemnation
Two instances within the survey period hint at the rich diversity reflected by the law of local government condemnation.255 In Cobb County
v. Sevani,'" the court of appeals confronted a condemnee's claim for attorney fees based "entirely upon the manner in which Condemnor had
conducted the pre-acquisition appraisal and'negotiations." s 7 The focus of
the 1986 attorney fee statute, s " the court reasoned, in no way implicates
actions prior to a legal proceeding:25 ' "Condemnor's preacquisitionactivities are totally irrelevant to the issue of whether it engaged in abusive
litigation in the superior court.'2 0 Although the preacquisition activities
may have impeached the county's declaration of taking, they provided no
basis for condemnee's recovery of attorney fees.201
The second instance, Cobb County v. Webb Development, Inc., sss confronted the supreme court with a dramatic confluence of condemnation
and mandamus.'" Specifically, plaintiff sought to mandamus the county's
condemnation of easements for sewer connections to plaintiff's subdivision lots.'" The court canvassed evidence that plaintiff had met every
253. 260 Ga. at 632, 398 S.E.2d at 11. As by express grant in a deed or through eminent
domain. Id.
254. Id. Thus, the court affirmed the trial judge's decision that the county could not
reopen the road. Id. at 631, 398 S.E.2d at 12.
255. For emphasis of that diversity, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Condemning Local Government Condemnation, 39 MERcR L. REV. 11 (1987); R. Perry Senteil, Jr., Local Government
Liability Limitations: "Causation" is to Tort as "Police Power" is to Eminent Domain,
URBAN GA., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 20.

256. 196 Ga. App. 247, 395 S.E.2d 572 (1990).
257. Id. at 247, 395 S.E.2d at 573.
258. O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (1986).
259. 196 Ga. at 248, 395 S.E.2d at 573-74. Here condemnee never challenged condemnor's legal right to condemn the property, and the issue of just and adequate compensation was resolved by the jury and not the superior court. Id., 395 S.E.2d at 574.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 249, 395 S.E.2d at 574. "Condemnee could not, however, acquiesce in Condemnor's taking of the property, proceed to trial before a jury on the issue of 'just and

adequate compensation,' and then move for attorney's fees pursuant to OCGA sec. 9-15-14
based upon Condemnor's alleged abusive pre-acquisition activities." Id. The court reversed
the trial judge's grant of condemnee's motion for attorney fees. Id.
262. 260 Ga. 605, 398 S.E.2d 3 (1990).
263. For treatment of this extraordinary writ, see R. PERvv SENTm.L, JE., MISCASTING
MANDAMus m Gzomuu LocAL GovaRNMme LAw (1989).
264. 260 Ga. at 605-06, 398 S.E.2d at 3. The county had approved plaintiff's development of the subdivision. Id.
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articulated county standard,2 had exhausted negotiation efforts and alternatives, had expended considerable sums in developing the subdivision, and was required by county ordinance to connect his lots to sewer
lines.26 Affirming the trial judge's issuance of mandamus, the court
viewed the evidence as establishing both plaintiff's "clear legal right" to
relief and the county's "gross abuse of discretion.' 7
G. Liability
The supreme court bounded the county liability province with two
mileposts during the period. At the threshold, the court tendered its solution to Logue v. Wright,'" an action alleging injury from the negligent
driving of a county deputy sheriff. In favoring summary judgment for the
deputy,'" the court plumbed the relevant points of departure. For "mere
negligence"'' 70 in his "official capacity,' 2 71 the county officer enjoyed sovereign immunity for "discretionary" acts, 27 2 unless the county "waived"
that immunity by obtaining "insurance.'1'7 Omission of a blue light or
siren when failing to yield the right of way constituted an act of negligence, the court reasoned, and the deputy's decision to rush to an emergency constituted the exercise of discretion,' 74 As for insurance, local gov265. Id. at 608, 398 S.E.2d at 5. These articulable standards included both the standards
in effect when plaintiff's subdivision plans were originally approved, as well as standards
that the county later adopted. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. "When an official act is discretionary, the court may compel the exercise of the
discretion, but it cannot direct the manner in which it shall be exercised ....
The trial
court did not err in allowing the Board to 'retain' the option to negotiate or condemn, nor in
allowing the Board to select the route if it condemns." Id. at 608-09, 398 S.E.2d at 6. Justice
Weltner dissented. Id. at 609, 398 S.E.2d at 6 (Weltner, J., dissenting).
268. 260 Ga. 206, 392 S.E.2d 235 (1990).
269. On the point of local government officer and employee liability, see generally R.
Perry Senteli, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officers: Rights for Their Wrongs, 13 GA. L.
Rav. 747 (1979), reprintedin P. SmNTLL, ADDITIONAL STrDuis, supra note 1, at 419; see also
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Individual Liability in Georgia Local Government Law: The Haunting
Hiatus of Hennessy, 40 MzRcmR L. Rav. 303 (1988).
270. As opposed to acts of malice, corruption, wilfulness, or reckless disregard for the
safety of others.
271. As opposed to an action against the officer in his "personal and individual"
capacity.
272. As opposed to "ministerial acts."
273. 260 Ga. 206, 392 S.E.2d 235 (1990). On the point of insurance, see generally R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Tort Liability Insurance in Georgia Local Government Law, 24 ME
R
L Ray. 651 (1973), reprintedin P. SENTELL, STuDIS, supra note 1, at 811; see also R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Tort Liability: The "Crisis" Conundrum, 2 GA. ST.
U.L. Rav. 19 (1986).
274. 260 Ga. at 207-08, 392 S.E.2d at 237. Negligence in performance of the act did not
change its character. Id. at 208, 392 S.E.2d at 237.
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ernments are required to insure neither their "motor vehicle" mishaps 76
nor their officers and employees. 171 Moreover, unlike the state, local governments possess no authority to formulate self-insurance programs for
7
employees.

7

It remained only for the court to fit principles to facts. First, the county
had purchased no liability insurance. Second, although the county budgeted its "department of risk management" to compensate claims against
the county and its employees, that program was devoid- of statutory authorization. Accordingly, the court declared, it "is not a self-insurance
7
plan which will waive sovereign immunity.' 8
Logue guided the court of appeals through a series of subsequent controversies. In Joyce v. Van Arsdale,'79 the court employed Logue to emphasize that county employees "may be held liable for the negligent performance of a ministerial act."' 80 The court held that a road
superintendent following orders to close a bridge acted ministerially,8 1
and if negligent, would bear liability for plaintiff's collision with a barricade."' In contrast, Vertner v. Gerberas 3 focused on a deputy warden who
made work assignments for prison inmates. The court held that the as4
signments were acts of discretion involving "judgment and experience,"''
and thus immunized the deputy from liability for an inmate's assault
275. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (1990). The court said that unlike local governments, the state
is required to purchase "motor vehicle" insurance under O.C.G.A. § 45-9-40 (1990 & Supp.
1991).
276. O.C.G.A. § 45-9-20 (1990). "It is apparent that the statute authorizing this purchase
does not require it." 260 Ga. at 208, 392 S.E.2d at 237. Moreover, "[n]othing in Toombs"
County v. O'Neal requires that counties procure insurance." Id.
277. O.C.G.A. § 45-9-1 (1990). "OCGA sec. 45-9-1(c) specifically excluded counties and
municipalities from the term 'agency' of the state." 260 Ga. at 208, 392 S.E.2d at 237.
278. 260 Ga. at 209, 392 S.E.2d at 238. "We hold that under the statutes dealing with
liability insurance for government employees and officials, only state self-insurance plans
will waive sovereign immunity. There is no provision for a county to set up a self-insurance
plan." Id. Presiding Justice Smith dissented forcefully and at length. Id. (Smith, P.J.,

dissenting).
279. 196 Ga. App. 95, 395 S.E.2d 275 (1990).
280. Id. at 96, 395 S.E.2d at 276. This was true, the court said, even when the county
had not waived immunity by purchasing insurance. Id.
281. Id. Although carrying out the commissioners' decision "undoubtedly involved the
exercise of some judgment," the "execution of a specific task is characterized as ministerial
even though the manner in which it is accomplished is left to the employee's discretion." Id.
at 97, 395 S.E.2d at 277.
282. Id. Thus, the court reversed the trial judge's summary judgment for the employees.
Id.
283. 198 Ga. App. 645, 402 S.E.2d 315 (1991).
284. Id. at 647, 402 S.E.2d at 316. No evidence suggested that the deputy "merely followed established guidelines in making these assignments." Id.
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upon plaintiff. 80 In Brantley v. Edwards,'86 the court absolved a county
from responsibility for an automobile accident. First, the county's denial
of insurance went unrefuted. Second, its decision to abstain from "motor
vehicle" insurance was discretionary.'87 Plaintiff suffered a similar fate in
Pizza Hut of America, Inc. v. Hood,'' a case concerning a drowning at a
county park. Awarding summary judgment for the county, the court
noted its policy of defending and paying claims from a "Self-Funded Insurance Internal Service Fund."'' Under Logue, the court asserted, that
fund "was s not a self-insurance plan that could waive sovereign
immunity.' 9
The supreme court unveiled its other revelation near the close of the
survey period with DeKalb County v. Orwig."' The action alleged "nuisance" for the second overflow of sewage into plaintiff's home. The overflow resulted from third party obstruction of a sewer line. The county
defended on grounds that its conduct (failure to discover the obstruction
three weeks earlier upon the first overflow) did not constitute the inverse
condemnation necessary for county "nuisance" liability. Although conceding historical accuracy in the county's position, the court of appeals announced the supreme court's "implicit" repudiation of that position. 2 As
in the municipal sphere, the court proclaimed county nuisance liability no
longer required inverse condemnation, and recoverable damages no longer
pivoted upon property depreciation.'"

285. Id. While on unguarded trash pick-up detail, the inmate chased his immediate supervisor with a pitchfork and wound up stabbing plaintiff who was working in the vicinity.
Id. at 646, 402 S.E.2d at 316; see also Gregory v. Cardenaz, 198 Ga. App. 697, 402 S.E.2d 757
(1991) (no evidence 'countering deputy sheriffs' evidence of discretion in responding to a
downed stop sign).

286. 197 Ga. App. 713, 399 S.E.2d 215 (1990).
287. Id. at 714, 399 S.E.2d at 216. The court thus sustained summary judgments for the
county and the commissioners. Id.
288. 198 Ga. App. 112, 400 S.E.2d 657 (1990).
289. Id. at 113, 400 S.E.2d at 659. The county had specifically decided against carrying

liability insurance. Id.
290. Id.
291. 261 Ga. 137, 402 S.E.2d 513 (1991). For discussion and analysis, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Georgia County Liability: Nuisance or Not?, 43 MancER L. RaV. 1 (1991).
292. DeKab County v. Orwig, 196 Ga. App. 255, 395 S.E.2d 824 (1990). The court found
the implicit repudiation in the decision of Fulton County v. Wheaton, 252 Ga. 49, 310
S.E.2d 910 (1984). 196 Ga. App. at 258, 395 S.E.2d at 826-27.
293.

196 Ga. App. at 258, 395 S.E.2d at 826-27. For treatment of municipal nuisances,

see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal Liability in Georgia: The "Nuisance" Nuisance, 12 GA.
ST. B.J. 11 (1975), repriritedin P. SENTELL, STuntls, supra note 1, at 843.

1991]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

Granting certiorari, the supreme court lost little time in reclaiming the
past. Charging the court of appeals with misinterpretation,2" the court

could scarcely have been more explicit: "[A] county cannot be liable for a
nuisance which does not rise to the level of a taking of property."" 96 Recoverable damages, in turn, focus exclusively on property value and "cannot include such items as damages for mental distress and expenses of
litigation."'" Significantly, therefore, Orwig entrenches the local government nuisance dichotomy with an unprecedented deliberateness.297
Between the two liability mileposts of the period, the court of appeals
operated on more traditional terrain. In the "civil rights" theater,'

Cleveland v. Fulton County'" featured a "Section 1983" complaint for
county delay in servicing an "E-911 call" from a facility located outside
the county. 00 On grounds that defendant had no connection with or control over plaintiff's decedent, the court found no "constitutional duty" to
provide the services. 0 1 As for the county's "undertaking" to serve, the

court denied that the Fourteenth Amendment transformed every state
law duty into a constitutional obligation.30 ' Although enjoying no greater
substantive success, a dismissed county school teacher in Allen v. Bergman303 prevailed on a procedural point: "[S]tates may no longer require
litigants to exhaust administrative remedies before asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state courts."''
294. 261 Ga. at 138, 402 S.E.2d at 514. The supreme court disapproved one of its quotations in Wheaton and declared that decision "not susceptible" to the court of appeals "interpretation." Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. For discussion in context, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia County Liability:Nuisance or Not?, 43 MaxcRa L. Rzv. 1 (1991).
298. See generally R. Pmu SEarLL,JF., GEORGIA LocAL GOVEuRNTs
LAw's AsSIMuATION or Monel: Section 1983 and the New "Persons" (1984).
299. 196 Ga. App. 168, 396 S.E.2d 2 (1990).
300. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The subject of the call was a patient in a state mental
health institute that was located in another county. Defendant county delayed in transferring the call, and the patient died. 196 Ga. App. at 169, 396 S.E.2d at 3.
301. 196 Ga. App. at 169, 396 S.E.2d at 3. The court reasoned that the "threshold element" necessary to a § 1983 claim was a "deprivation of rights (I [] secured by the constitution and laws of the United States." Id.
302. Id. at 169-70, 396 S.E.2d at 3. The court thus affirmed summary judgment for the
county. Id. at 170, 396 S.E.2d at 4.
303. 198 Ga. App. 57, 400 S.E.2d 347 (1990).
304. Id. at 58, 400 S.E.2d at 348-49. The admonition came from Felder v. Casey, 487
U.S. 131 (1988). On the merits, the court rejected plaintiff's charge of handicap discrimination against the county school board for termination upon her refusal to move to another
school. 198 Ga. App. at 58-59, 400 S.E.2d at 348-49.
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Finally, Hayes v. Medical Department of DeKalb County Jail'" exposed yet another victim to the historic time mandate for claims against
counties." Plaintiff in Hayes filed his negligence action on October 12,
1989, alleging that he was given the wrong medication while a county jail
inmate. Because plaintiff was aware "of any injury that may have occurred, and whose conduct was involved by early May 1988," the court
perceived0 7 his, action as having been filed beyond twelve months of
accrual.

H. Zoning
The overarching issue of zoning, whatever its guise in the particular
case, goes to local government discretion in striking the eternal balance
between "public good" and "individual rights." 308 Fulton County v. Wallace" involved a county's reaction to a trial judge's invalidation of the
"apartment development" zone for plaintiff's property.10 After the apartment restriction was deemed invalid, the county removed it, thereby permitting use for any residential purpose, but not "commercial shopping"
as plaintiff had requested 1 A unanimous supreme court emphasized
that the land was "fringe area" property,' an integral part of a Community Unit Plan,' 1 ' and that opinions had genuinely differed over appropriate compliance with the trial judge's decision.' 1 4 In these circumstances,
305. 197 Ga. App. 563, 398 S.E.2d 837 (1990).
306. O.C.G.A: § 36-11-1 (1987). For treatment of this statute, its history and effects, see
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Claims Against Counties: The Difference A Year Makes, 36 MMECER
L. REv. 1 (1984).
307. 197 Ga. App. at 564, 398 S.E.2d at 839. "Thus, this is when the claim accrued and
appellant had 12 months from this time to file his civil suit." Id.
308. See, e.g., R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Exposure to Local Government
Zoning, 25 GA ST. BJ. 180 (1989).
309. 260 Ga. 358, 393 S.E.2d 241' (1990).
310. The trial court's order declared the classification unconstitutional and then proceeded simply to summarize "expert testimony" that the tract could not be economically
developed for apartments and was ideally suited for commercial development. Id. at 359 n.2,
393 S.E.2d at 242 n.2.
311. Id. at 358-60, 393 S.E.2d at 242-43.
312. Id. at 361, 393 S.E.2d at 243. In considering changes for that type of property, the
court reasoned, "the balance favors even broader discretion in the local zoning authority. Id.
313. Id. Thus, any change would impact on other property developed in accordance with
the unit plan. Id.
314. Id. The court noted the differing opinions of the attorneys for the respective parties. Id. at 359-60, 393 S.E.2d at 242-43.
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the county's attempt to reach a compromise satisfactory to the interested
constituencies did not rise to the level of inverse condemnation3 1
County discretion also dominated Emory University v. Levitas,"1 ' a
challenge to the county's grant of a building height variance. 17 Holding
that the trial judge should have reviewed the grant under an "any-evidence standard,"" the court examined the county ordinance. That ordinance allowed a variance when "exceptional conditions" rendered development requirements unduly harsh upon the property owner.8 1' Under
the "exceptional conditions" language, the court found that the county
did not abuse its discretion in permitting a building sufficiently high to
avoid its encroachment into a bordering rare and unique first-growth
forest 3 0
A landowner frequently responds to the county's refusal of zoning ex82
21 ' Shockley v. Fayette County3
ceptions with an action in mandamus.

featured such a response to a variance denial by the county board of zoning appeals.28 To the county's objection that plaintiff had not appealed
the constitutional issues from the board to the county commission, the
supreme court conceded that the required procedure was somewhat unclear.2 4 Because this county's ordinance specified no means of proceeding
315. Id. at 361, 393 S.E.2d at 244. The court reversed a damage award and remanded for
"available remedies ... found in Cobb County v. Wilson, 259 Ga. 685, [386 S.E.2d 128
(1989)1." 260 Ga. at 361, 393 S.E.2d at 244.
316. 260 Ga. 894, 401 S.E.2d 691 (1991).
317. Id. at 894-95, 401 S.E.2d at 692. The county had granted the university's request
that it be permitted to build an eighteen-story hotel and conference center, necessary to
satisfy its academic needs, in an area zoned for maximum heights of five stories. Id.
318. Id. at 898, 401 S.E.2d at 694. The court held that the trial court had erred in reviewing the county's grant under a "substantial-evidence" standard. Id.
319. Id. at 899, 401 S.E.2d at 695-96 (quoting § 11-2323(3) of DeKalb County Code).
320. Id. The University also owned that tract and promised to create a botanical preserve of the first-growth forest Id. at 895, 401 S.E.2d at 693. Justice Hunt and Justice
Fletcher dissented to portions of the court's opinion. Id. at 900-01, 401 S.E.2d at 696-97
(Hunt & Fletcher, JJ., dissenting).
321. See FL PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LocAL GOVERNMENT
LAW (1989).
322. 260 Ga. 489, 396 S.E.2d 883 (1990).
323. Plaintiff sought to escape a county amendment to the zoning ordinance that raised
the minimum size of subdivided lots from one to two acres. Id. at 489-90, 396 S.E.2d at 883.
324. Id. at 490, 396 S.E.2d at 883. The court noted the diversity in county zoning procedures. In some, variance applications are made to the local governing body; in others, applications are made to a board of zoning appeals with direction that appeals be taken to the
governing body; in still others, applications are made to the board, but no means of appeal
are provided. According to the court, under the first two methods, the landowner has the
opportunity to raise any constitutional contentions before the governing body and must do
so. Id.
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from the board of zoning appeals' decisions, however, mandamus to the
superior court was proper.82 '
Also proceeding in mandamus, plaintiff in Tilley Properties, Inc. v.
Bartow County"O raised a novel issue under the general statutes comprising the "Zoning Procedures Law."' "s7 The statutes require notice and
hearing before the local government adopts "policies and procedures
which govern calling and conducting hearings. ''sa That requirement,
plaintiff maintained, invalidated a zoning ordinance adopted when the
county failed to conduct a hearing for "adopt[ing the] policies and procedures to govern calling and conducting of zoning hearings."' ' 9 The supreme court agreed with plaintiff's interpretation, emphasized the requirement's "mandatory" character, and invalidated the county zoning
ordinance."s0 Accordingly, the court held plaintiff's property unzoned and
ordered issuance of a land use certificate."81
III. LEGISLATION

Space limitations render impossible a meaningful description of 1991
statutes affecting local government. The following selected sketches (all
general statutes) indicate the range of concerns legislatively addressed
this year.
The author of a local bill must submit an affidavit stating that the requisite notice of intent to introduce the legislation has been legally
published."'
A permit modification procedure was established for local governments
desiring to extend the life of existing land disposal facilities."'s Addition325. Id. at 490-91, 396 S.E.2d at 884. The court emphasized that the issues must be
raised before the board in order to provide the board with the opportunity to grant the
variance and thereby remedy the alleged deficiency as applied to plaintiffs property. Id. at
491, 396 S.E.2d at 884. Justices Weltner and Hunt concurred with reservations. Id. (Hunt &
Weltner, JJ., dissenting).
326. 261 Ga. 153, 401 S.E.2d 527 (1991).
327.
328.

O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1 to -5 (1987).
Id. § 36-66-5.

329. 261 Ga. at 154, 401 S.E.2d at 528.
330. Id. at 153-55, 401 S.E.2d at 528-29.
331. Id. at 155, 401 S.E.2d at 529. The court thus reversed the trial judge's denial of
plaintiff's petition for mandamus. Id. Justice Fletcher, joined by Justice Benham, dissented
on the ground that the county did provoke notice and hearing prior to the adoption of the
zoning ordinance, and thus satisfied the statute. Id. (Benham & Fletcher, JJ., dissenting).
The dissent denied that the statute required two separate public hearings, one prior to establishing procedures for conducting hearings and another prior to adopting the zoning ordinance itself. Id. (Benham & Fletcher, JJ., dissenting).
332.

O.C.G.A. § 28-1-14 (Supp. 1991).

333. Id. § 12-8-24 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
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ally, local governments with facilities having less than twenty-four
months of remaining capacity are allowed to vertically expand the facilities for up to two years. 8"
Local governments are authorized to preserve burial grounds and to issue permits for disturbing such grounds.8 5 Counties are freed from limitations upon expenses incurred for the burial of deceased indigents; the
amount of expense incurred is now a matter of county discretion 8 0
Local governments are authorized to reimburse legal expenses of officers charged with theft or embezzlement of the government's property if
the official is found not guilty of the charge or if the charge is dismissed." 7 Public officials are criminally liable for the offense of bribery if
they solicit or receive property to which they are not otherwise entitled
upon the representation that their official actions are thereby
influenced.3 8
Local government hospital authorities are empowered to own and operate projects in other counties and municipalities upon approval of those
governments. Authorities may also provide assistance to organizations
rendering health services to citizens without regard to the citizens'
residences.8 8 '
A county may impose fines up to $1,000 (increased from $500) for violations of ordinances affecting the county's unincorporated area." 0
An applicant for local government rezoning must disclose any campaign
contributions in excess of $250 made within two years immediately preceding the application to any official who will consider the application.",
IV. CONCLUSION
This year's stunning victory calls for unrestrained celebration of independence in the camp of local government law. Justified jubilation must
not blur, however, the bifocal vision of the present agenda: a deference of
civility to other disciplines, but an unyielding vigilance against the aggression of ambivalence. Next year's survey will map the environmental
strategy.

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id.

Id. §§ 36-72-1 to -16 (Supp. 1991).
Id. § 36-12-5 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
Id. § 45-9-21 (1990 & Supp. 1991).
Id. § 16-10-2 (Supp. 1991).
Id. 1%31-7-71, 31-7-75 (1991).
Id. § 36-1-20 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
Id. §§ 36-67A-1 to 67A-6 (Supp. 1991).

